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White-Hughley v. State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 47 (Sept. 16, 2021)1 
CRIMINAL LAW: CLARIFYING THE STATUTORY PARAMETERS OF CRIMINAL 
SENTENCING 
Summary  
The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the Court of Appeal’s affirmance of the Eighth 
District Court’s sentencing decision en banc. The defendant was simultaneously arrested and 
detained on two warrants for two separate offenses and entered into one “package deal” plea 
agreement for both. The sentencing for the two offenses was not simultaneous however, and the 
issue arose regarding whether the defendant could be credited for the time served against both 
concurrent sentences. The lower court took NRS 176.055(1)2 to mean that allowing the 
defendant credit for time served in the instant offense when he had received credit in the earlier 
sentencing for another offense would constitute impermissible “double dipping”. The Court of 
Appeals upheld the decision. The Supreme Court of Nevada, relying on their previous holdings3, 
clarified under precedent in tandem with NRS 176.055(1) a defendant is entitled to credit for all 
time served in presentencing confinement and when confined on multiple cases simultaneously, 
credit shall be given for the time served from the beginning of confinement until sentenced for 
the first offense. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded for 
sentencing in accordance with the clarifying opinion. Justice Herndon dissented.  
Facts and Procedural History  
On October 1, 2019, appellant White-Hughley was arrested and detained on outstanding 
warrants in both a child-abuse related case and another for home invasion. White-Hughley plead 
guilty to both charges pursuant to an agreement that the sentences would run concurrently. 
Sentencing proceedings for each of the charges was handled separately, with two different judges 
presiding. In December of 2019, Judge Tierra Jones sentenced White Hughley to 12-36 months 
for the child-abuse charge, with credit for time for served. In January of 2020, however, Judge 
David Jones handed down a 12-30 month sentence in the home invasion case and denied to apply 
time-credit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and the Supreme Court of 
Nevada granted the petition for review.  
Discussion  
In a de novo review, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether the District Court 
erred in denying credit for time served against the sentence for home invasion. The prosecution 
opposed the grant, arguing that the credit granted in the earlier sentencing precluded White-
Hughley from receiving credit against the latter sentence. Judge Jones accepted this argument, 
relying on a series of unpublished opinions by the court and the fact that this is always how he 
 
1  Candace Mays. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. 176.055(1) (providing that a court may grant credit against the sentence for time spent in 
confinement prior to conviction unless served pursuant a judgment of conviction for another offense, or unless 
otherwise prohibited by statute).  
3  Kuykendall v. State 112 Nev. 1287, 926 P.2d 781 (1996); Poasa v. State, 135 Nev. 426, 453 P.3d 387 (2019);  
Johnson v. State 120 Nev. 296, 89 P.3d 669 (2004). 
ruled in his court. White-Hughley rebutted to the Court of Appeals that he should have “at least” 
gotten credit for the time in confinement prior to the initial sentencing.  
In their analysis, the Supreme Court relied on their earlier decision in Kuykendall and 
reiterated their holdings in Poasa v. State and Jackson v. State to clarify the proper interpretation 
of NRS 176.055(1). In Kuykendall, the court held that, in an interest of fairness and ensuring 
equal protection, NRS 176.055 should broadly construed in favor of granting a defendant credit 
for all presentencing time served. The court reasserted the Kuykendall principle, that despite the 
discretionary language of the statute, a defendant shall not be denied credit for time served 
absent any statutory provision negating the defendant’s eligibility. In Jackson, the court applied 
the Kuykendall holding and awarded credit for time served on each of the multiple counts within 
the same case.  
Here, the court acknowledged the distinctions between the precedent cited and the instant 
case. White-Hughley, unlike the defendant in Jackson, was seeking to credit for two charges 
under two different cases. Unlike White-Hughley, the defendants in Kuykendall and Poasa had a 
single charge and case for which time-credit was being sought. The Court nevertheless held that 
“…the takeaway from Poasa, Kuykendall, and Johnson is uniform and applicable here…”, that 
absent some statutory prohibition, defendants are entitled to credit for any presentence time they 
serve. Anything else would be an impermissible deprivation that “renders such an award a nullity 
or little more than a paper credit.”4 Here, whereas the sentences for both charges were similar in 
time and were essentially conjoined by the package-deal plea agreement, there would be no 
proper purpose to treat them as fully distinct for the purposes of disqualifying application of time 
served to the latter. 
Conclusion  
The Court held that the District Court’s decision was inconsistent with the interpretation 
of NRS 176.055(1) that governed in the jurisdiction. The court determined that any time served 
prior to sentencing shall be credited as time served on all offenses relating to the simultaneous 
confinement at that time. Thus, the judgment is vacated and remanded for sentencing in 
accordance with the opinion.  
Dissent 
Justice Hendon, in his dissenting opinion, insisted that the majority’s opinion constituted 
an alteration of the statute rather than mere clarification. He reasoned that since the language of 
NRS 176.055(1) says that a court may order credit against time served, the majority decision 
impermissibly thwarted the District Court’s discretion to decide these cases on a case-by-case 
basis. Under stare decisis he argued, he would have affirmed the lower court decisions. He cited 
the majority’s distinction between White-Hughley’s case and the precedent relied on in the 
majority decision to reject the argument that the similarities of the charges in the instant case 
rendered it necessary for them to be taken as the same for the purposes of sentencing.  
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